What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?
2
After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it-a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?
Some components of a good life are good because they are efficient means to getting other goods. A college education is good (among other reasons) because it usually enables the recipient to have a higher income, and high income is good because money is a means to whatever is for sale. Our concern is with the characterization of what is intrinsically good, good for its own sake, rather than as a means to other goods. 1 In this essay I discuss the distinction between subjective and objective theories of good (that is, well-being or prudential value). I defend a type of objective theory, the Objective List account. The defense proceeds by contrasting this account with two rivals, hedonism and desire fulfillment. These terms will be explained shortly. At several points I try to draw out the difficulties in these two accounts by considering internal tensions in the theory of the good developed by John Stuart Mill, which attempts to combine the advantages of hedonism and desire fulfillment by fusion. Hedonism as I construe it is unsatisfactory for a general reason: it implies that nothing can matter prudentially to an individual except the quality of her experience, but this seems counterintuitive. The desire fulfillment account resolves this difficulty, but gives rise to others, and the accounting of the strengths and weaknesses of this account, especially in its refined form, is complex. The desire fulfillment view has the resources to resist some 3 criticisms, but succumbs to others. The devastating force of the objections against its main rivals is good news for the Objective List theory, but it is also subject to strong criticisms. One criticism consists in skeptical doubt that there is no uniquely rational way to determine what putative goods qualify as entries on the List. Skepticism here is a genuine worry, but not one this essay considers. But setting aside skeptical doubt, I note another criticism that threatens to be devastating. The Objective List account allows that something I get can intrinsically enhance my well-being even though I hate it, and some will find this result puzzling or worse. Mixed or composite accounts deal with this latter difficulty by stipulating that nothing can intrinsically enhance an individual's well-being unless it is both truly worthwhile and also affirmed or endorsed by that very individual.
Roughly speaking, this mixed view combines the desire fulfillment theory and the Objective list theory. The essay concludes by finding grounds to resist the mixed account and to favor the pure Objective List theory.
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE THEORIES
Philosophers have debated whether good is objective or subjective. Different questions have been asked under this description. Subjective theories of human good are sometimes taken to be those that "make welfare depend at least in part on some mental state." 2 The intended contrast is with objective theories of well-being which make the well-being of an agent depend entirely on states of the world apart from the state of mind of the agent whose well-being is under review. This is a coherent usage, but potentially confusing. A Platonic theory which held that the good for humans is perception and understanding of the Forms counts as subjective on this usage. I would prefer to let the contrast between objective and subjective mark the contrast between (1) views which Objective List Theories, according to which, "certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things." 3 The three theories do not exhaust the possibilities, but this is not a serious defect, because the known plausible candidates are included. The trouble with the definitions of these categories is that they do not establish the three theories as mutually exclusive and clearly counterposed. Suppose it should turn out that the Objective List contains one item, namely, happiness. In this case (1) and (3) come to the same. Suppose that the Objective List contains one item, namely, desire fulfillment. In this case (2) and (3) come to the same. With desire fulfillment as the sole entry on the list, the Objective List theory then holds that desire fulfillment is good for a person, and desire nonfulfillment bad, whether or not the person wants to have desire fulfillment or to avoid desire nonfulfillment.
We could secure the result that Parfit's three theories are mutually exclusive if we revise them as follows: The Hedonistic Theory holds that happiness, and happiness alone, is prudentially valuable for its own sake, whereas the Desire Fulfillment Theory holds that desire fulfillment, and that only that, is prudentially valuable for its own sake, 5 and the Objective List theory holds that more than one type of thing is prudentially valuable for its own sake. On the revised view, the essence of the Objective List Theory is that there is more than one entry on the list.
But it would be unsatisfactory to transform the Objective List theory into the Plural-Entry List theory. My main quarrel with Parfit's classification scheme is that a theory that intuitively is not an objective theory at all could qualify as a version of the One of the more puzzling features of J.S. Mill's analyses of human good in
Utilitarianism and in On Liberty is that the two accounts are opposed on a significant point. 5 In Utilitarianism Mill asserts that human good is to be equated to happiness, that happiness is pleasure and absence of pain, and that the quality of one pleasure as compared to another is determined by the preference of experienced and competent judges for one over the other. It is obvious that Mill aims to avoid the result that the welfare an individual gains from some putative good is determined by her own perhaps idiosyncratic or confused appraisal of her experience of the good. To achieve this end,
Mill proposes an analysis with the feature, which some will find peculiar, that the value of the pleasure I get from eating a peach, compared to the value I get from a pear, is determined not by my own experience of the peach and pear but by the preferences and judgments of a panel of fruit-tasting experts who sample each fruit.
In But what he would be mistaken about is the quantity or quality of pleasure that he himself would derive from various sources. Where Mill seems to go wrong is in trying to fix by stipulation that the consensus of expert judgment (the judgment of other, experienced 9 people about their own experiences) determines the quantity and quality of pleasure that I would get from one or another sort of experience. This move insists on objectivity by denying relativity to the individual, but this move is unnecessary.
IS THE OBJECTIVE LIST THEORY A THEORY?
There is a rudimentary theory associated with the Objective List account of the good. The theory holds that what is intrinsically good for an individual, good for its own sake rather than as a means to some further good, is to get or achieve the items that are specified on a correct and complete list of such goods. persons with happiness and happiness with pleasure and the absence of pain. 7 This set of equations raises issues about how we are to understand the notions of pleasure and pain as they are used in Mill's theory of the good. Quite aside from these issues, Mill's position looks to be unsatisfactory for a quite general reason. As Robert Nozick has noticed, a hedonistic view such as Mill's, which takes pleasure to be constitutive of good, 13 is a member of a wider family of views, which take the good to be constituted by some quality of experience. 8 Nozick has a powerful objection against the class of quality of experience views. The objection is expressed in an example. We care, and it is reasonable for us to care, about things other than the quality of our experience. Realization of this point emerges if we contemplate our reaction to an imaginary experience machine, which could give an individual a perfect simulacrum of any life so far as the experience of that life is concerned. Hooked up to the experience machine, you would have the experience of leading any life you might choose, while really being, as Nozick states, "an indeterminate blob" floating in a tank. 9 If we care only about quality of experience, it is irrational to refuse to plug into the experience machine, just as it would be irrational, if my only aim is to open a bottle of beer 10 swiftly, to reject the mechanical aid of a bottle opener and insist upon the slower method of opening the bottle with my teeth. If we nonetheless think that it need not be unreasonable to refuse to live our lives plugged into the experience machine, this signals that we have aims other than achieving any specified type of experience. We want to have faithful friends and be a good friend ourselves, not merely to have the experience of such friendship, and we wish actually to accomplish something significant in the world, not just to have the experience of doing that, and so on.
THE HYBRID VIEW 14
Despite the experience machine example and its lessons, one might hold fast to
the thought that what is inherently good for a person must entirely consist in the quality of her experience. If we accept that however thrilling to experience, life in the experience machine is just floating as a conscious blob in a tank, and so not a genuinely good life, we might embrace a hybrid view according to which the character of one's experience can vary in value not just in virtue of its subjectively felt quality but also in virtue of its relationship to the world.
The hybrid view would allow us to judge that false pleasures contribute less to the value of the life of the person who experiences them than they otherwise would. A "false" pleasure here is one that is accompanied by significant false beliefs about the nature of the experience in which the agent finds enjoyment. Perhaps a better position would be that the value of a pleasure may vary not just in virtue of its felt quality but also in virtue of the actual character of the activity in the experience of which pleasure is taken. This position would allow discounting the value of pleasure taken in the supposed awareness that one's spouse is sexually faithful when this is not actually the case. But the position would be sufficiently flexible to allow that false beliefs held by an agent about a pleasurable experience can render the pleasure more valuable than it would otherwise be if the experience is actually more valuable or admirable than the agent believes. For example, one might hold that the bittersweet pleasure of completing a long-term project of writing an epic poem, which one believes to be weak but which is actually brilliantly effective, has more value than it would have if one's belief about the weakness of the poem were correct.
Mill's position in Utilitarianism might be an instance of a hybrid view. 11 One 15 might interpret Mill as holding that nothing is prudentially valuable except the experience of one's activity, and experience must be pleasurable to be valuable. The pleasure of pleasurable activities varies in intensity and duration, and the more pleasure an activity contains, the more valuable it is. But besides differing in quantity of pleasure, pleasurable activities differ in their quality, which is measured by the preferences for one pleasurable activity over another by knowledgeable and competent experts. These experts might judge one activity such as surfing to be of higher quality than another activity such as sunbathing, so that surfing yields more prudential value per unit of pleasure it delivers than sunbathing does. Confronted with the experience machine example, Mill on this interpretation should reply that whether, for example, the pleasures of actual friendship are superior to the pleasures of experience machine simulations of friendship is determined by the preferences of judges who have tried both types of pleasure and are fully capable of appreciating each. Nothing in Mill's testing procedure ensures that the judges in arriving at their preferences in such cases should attend only to the felt quality of the experiences. They might prefer actual friendship pleasure over experience machine pleasure because they regard the former as more fitting for human beings, worthy, dignified, and the like.
Whatever other difficulties the hybrid view might face, it seems deficient for a simple reason. An individual may have a strong and reasonable desire that a certain state of affairs concerning himself should obtain. This state of affairs might involve no experience of any sort on the part of the desiring agent. One desires that the novel one has written should prove to be a good novel. Here the state of affairs that is desired does not essentially involve any experience of any sort on the part of the agent. Yet it is 16 plausible to suppose that a desire of this sort, if satisfied, contributes directly to the wellbeing of the agent. If this claim is correct, the hybrid view is doomed.
DESIRE SATISFACTION
If we reject the hybrid view, and with it the claim that "nothing can make our lives go better or worse unless it somehow affects the quality of our experience," 12 the rival view that immediately becomes salient is the Desire Fulfillment Theory. We can always put the content of a desire in the form of a proposition; my desire for strawberries at breakfast is the desire that the proposition "Arneson eats strawberries at breakfast" should become true. A desire is fulfilled when the associated proposition becomes true.
The fulfillment of a desire need not involve any experience of fulfillment, and the satisfaction of some desires can occur without the occurrence of any conscious episodes of any sort in the desirer. My desire that the novel I have written is praiseworthy is fulfilled just in case it is praiseworthy, whatever reasonable or unreasonable opinions on this matter I might come to hold. So the Desire Fulfillment Theory is not embarrassed by the fact that one's desires range beyond one's actual or possible experience. Fulfillment of basic (i.e., noninstrumental) desires can enhance well-being whether or not the fulfillment is experienced or even capable of being experienced.
According to the Desire Fulfillment Theory, one's life goes better, the more it is the case that one's basic desires are satisfied, with desires that rank as more important in the agent's hierarchy of desires counting for more if fulfilled.
This simple desire fulfillment view is vulnerable to two significant objections.
First, not all of an agent's desires plausibly bear on her well-being. I might listen to a televised plea for famine relief, and form the desire to aid distant starving strangers, 17 without myself thinking (and without its being plausible for anyone else to think) that the fulfillment of this desire would in any way make my life go better. So one needs to restrict somehow the class of basic desires whose fulfillment contributes to well-being. It will not do to stipulate that each agent determines for herself which of her basic desires bear on her well-being. Surely an agent could make a mistake in making this determination, and we need some way of deciding when a mistake occurs. And an account is needed of what an agent is doing in making the determination that fixes which of her desires shall contribute to her well-being. If we say that that she divides her basic desires into two piles, those whose satisfaction would contribute to her well-being and the rest, our account is rendered viciously circular, and requires that we already have an idea of well-being independent of desire fulfillment. 13 It is perhaps worth noting that switching allegiance from a Desire Fulfillment to an Objective List theory of well-being does not solve this difficulty but only reduces its scope. At least this is so if desire fulfillment ends up being an entry on the List, as is surely plausible. Surely satisfying the basic desires one regards as important over the course of one's life is one component of a good life. Then for this component, the problem of finding a principled restriction on the class of desires whose fulfillment contributes to well-being still remains.
The second objection against simple Desire Fulfillment is that some desires that are felt to be of great importance by the individual, and desired for their own sake, not as a means to further goals, are only desired because the individual is confused, ignorant, or making reasoning errors. These desires would not survive reflective critical scrutiny. 
THE PROBLEM OF NONPRUDENTIAL DESIRE
Of the two objections against the desire satisfaction account just raised, the first may be the more intractable. The second invites the response that only those basic desires that do not arise from cognitive error or ignorance intrinsically enhance a person's well-being if they are satisfied. This response is explored in the next three sections.
Whether or not it ultimately succeeds, this strategy of refining the desire satisfaction account surely has some initial plausibility. But this strategy does nothing to resolve the first difficulty. A person may well desire for its own sake something other than her own well-being, and may continue to do so even after ideal critical scrutiny with full information.
To save the desire satisfaction account, one must find a principled way of restricting the portion of an individual's basic desires, satisfaction of which constitutes her well-being. Examples such as desiring that life be discovered somewhere in outer space or desiring that distant strangers should not suffer in poverty might suggest the proposal that only desires that concern the agent's own life qualify as welfare- 19 determining for that agent. But the desire to sacrifice one's life for the sake of others evidently concerns one's own life but intuitively is not such that its satisfaction intrinsically increases one's well-being.
Another possible restriction is to exclude from the set of welfare-determining desires those that are adopted by the agent from moral considerations. If I desire to keep a promise because I believe that promise-keeping is morally obligatory, it does seem sensible to deny that my life goes better if this desire is fulfilled. But there are other examples. I might come to have a strong desire that endangered animal species survive or that distant strangers should not live in poverty even if I am moved to adopt the desire by sympathy for the plight of the species and the strangers quite independently of moral considerations.
Without pursuing this issue further, I will simply register my conviction that there is no viable solution to the problem of nonprudential desire. The next sections pursue the strengths and weaknesses of simple and refined desire satisfaction accounts on the assumption that this problem can be solved despite the doubts registered here. It turns out that even if there were no nonprudential desire problem the desire satisfaction account would still be plagued with troubles.
Another road might be taken at this juncture. One might reinterpret the desire satisfaction account as giving a necessary, not a sufficient condition for prudential value.
Nothing can intrinsically enhance an individual's well-being unless she desires that thing.
The fact that one can seemingly have desires for what does not enhance one's well-being is no embarrassment for this less ambitious account.
Desire-satisfaction construed as a necessary condition might play a role in many 20 types of analysis of prudential value. Perhaps the most plausible mixed theories of this sort will combine desire-satisfaction with either a quality of experience requirement or an
Objective List requirement. The first view would maintain that if something intrinsically enhances an individual's well-being, it must be desired by that individual and pleasurable. The second view would maintain that if something intrinsically enhances an individual's well-being, it must be desired by that individual and objectively worthwhile.
The second view is discussed, and rejected, later in this essay, when the endorsement constraint is examined and found wanting. The claim that nothing can intrinsically enhance an individual's welfare unless she desires it is one specific version of the endorsement constraint. The first view supposes that nothing can intrinsically enhance an individual's well-being unless the experience of that putative good is pleasurable (or in the more general case, has a desirable quality). The "Hybrid View" section of this essay already has criticized this position, which cannot be upheld by anyone who acknowledges that some contributors to well-being are not experienced at all. For example, the desire that one's childrearing activity should be successful in the sense that one's child comes to have a good life is not a desire to have any sort of experience. If such a desire can contribute to one's well-being, then no mixed view that includes an experience requirement as a necessary condition for prudential value can be correct.
INFORMED DESIRE SATISFACTION
Consider again the claim that the satisfaction of any of an individual's basic desires intrinsically enhances her well-being, and assume that the nonprudential desire problem can be solved. In response to the objection that some desires are based on mistakes and ignorance, turn now to refinements of Desire Fulfillment theories that hold To block this objection, it suffices to stipulate that the ideal advisor will be sympathetic to the individual whose welfare his desires fix. The ideal advisor's sole aim is to advance the well-being of the advisee.
2. Another set of objections begins with the speculation that in the course of becoming fully informed, the ideal advisor, even though starting with my personality, may alter psychologically to such an extent that I should not necessarily regard the desires of this very different individual for my well-being as normative for me. 17 The fact that my ideal advisor would want me to want X might not induce me to want X. But, so the objection runs, it was supposed to be part of the attraction of ideal advisor views that they would satisfy an internalist constraint. And according to internalism, any valid
claim as to what is good for me must motivate me to want that thing, at least under some ideal conditions. As Railton observes, "it would be an intolerably alienated conception of 23 someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any way to engage him." 18 My response to this objection is that internalism is too demanding a condition to impose on theories of the good, so the fact that informed desire theories fail to meet the condition, if indeed it is a fact, casts no discredit on these theories. It may be that some psychological defect, some missing screw in the desiring department of my brain, prevents me from desiring some things that are in fact good for me. My ideal advisor will want me to want these things, and regret my psychological incapacity. Given the incapacity, if I were to discover that my ideal advisor would want me to want these things which seem undesirable to me, this knowledge would ex hypothesi not be sufficient to cause me to desire them. Without further argument to motivate an internalist constraint on acceptable theories of well-being, this possibility by itself does not reveal a defect in the ideal advisor account. is is, and it's wonderful. But since I failed to entertain a prospective desire for this treat, and cannot logically form a desire about a past occurrence, this good slips between the slats of the ideal advisor account, and does not register in that account as a contribution to my well-being. 19 One might wonder whether the counterexample could be deflected by finding a more abstract desire that the unique sunrise experience qualifies as satisfying.
But I have a prior worry. It seems incorrect to assert that desires cannot be retrospective. 24 I performed miserably in the last tournament of my dismal high school wrestling career, and ever since then I have strongly desired that I had performed better. This is not a mere idle wish; I would give up resources to satisfy this aim if doing so would be useful. Or if one insists that "desires" regarding the past properly are characterized as wishes, then we can readily construct a new notion of desire that incorporates the prospective attitudes that Sumner counts as desires plus heartfelt wishes regarding the past, and reconstruct the ideal advisor informed desire view with this revisionary understanding of desire.
Another objection is that the idea of becoming fully informed is radically
indeterminate. 20 Information can be presented to an individual in different ways through different media. A television broadcast, a rousing speech, a novel, a poem, a painting, a popular song can all present the same propositions to an audience of would-be ideal advisors who are becoming fully and vividly informed. But there is no determinate answer to the question, which mode of presentation conveys a more vivid impression.
There are many dimensions of vividness corresponding to the various modes of presentation. Being more vividly informed along one dimension is being informed less vividly along other dimensions. Presenting information in all possible modes of presentation seriatim is no solution, even if the idea is coherent, because this would just be a mind-deadening nearly interminable and devastatingly boring presentation.
If the notion of becoming fully and vividly informed is indeterminate, this slack will be transmitted to yield indeterminacy in the idea of what is good for a person according to the ideal advisor account. However, this is an objection against the account only if it can be shown that the ideal advisor account yields indeterminacy where we have good reason to believe there should be none. But perhaps the correct inference to draw is 25 that the notion of what is good for a person is inherently indeterminate, so that it is (for example) neither the case that eating fish nor eating fowl is a better culinary experience for me, because the judgment of my ideal advisor on these putative goods is unstable in response to various modes of presentation of the relevant information. It might turn out to be a strength of the ideal advisor account that it allows for only limited commensurability of prudential value. One's ideal advisor will know the psychological laws and propensities that govern responsiveness of creatures such as us to varying types of presentation of information, and will take steps to prevent arbitrary contingencies such as order of presentation to affect the desire formation process unless this is unavoidable.
But if it is a deep truth about my individual nature that a person of my type me likes fowl better than fish if fowl is tasted first in life and fish better if the taste of fish comes first, then neither fish nor fowl is inherently better, and if I have not yet tasted either, which I
get is a "don't care" in the judgment of my ideal advisor.
5. An objection along somewhat the same line denies that one could actually become fully and vividly informed as the application of the ideal advisor account requires. 21 In one possible life I might lead, I am innocent as a choir boy, and in another possible life, I become conversant with sin; in one life, I become a fierce warrior; in another, a gentle, sensitive soul. These traits cannot be combined in a single person. I cannot then hold in one consciousness all of these and the myriad other possible experiences I would have to have in order to qualify as fully informed so that my ideally informed self could give me authoritative guidance about well-being.
In response: The difficulties proposed arise from the assumption that to be fully informed, one must actually experience all of the putative goods which are to be ordered likings do play such a constitutive or determining role, we seem stuck with the unappealing consequences that the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure is thrown into doubt. 22 If we say that the desires, satisfaction of which enhances our well-being, are those that would survive ideal critical reflection with full information, we have a response to 28 the puzzle. The desires for pleasure and against pain survive critical reflection for an odd reason. We cannot think of anything to say for or against either pleasure or pain, and our inability to find reasons bearing on the matters does not shake our initial aversion from pain and attraction to pleasure. Nor can we imagine that further information of any sort would alter our inchoate confidence. The conviction that pain is bad and pleasure good does fit smoothly into the set of our considered judgments in the widest reflective equilibrium we can attain. If one imagines a life that is wonderful in every detail, and then adds the further stipulation that the person is either miserable throughout her life or thoroughly enjoys almost every minute of it (without the pain being debilitating, or the pleasure stimulating, in ways that affect the degree to which any other goods are attained), one is strongly inclined to prefer, and to prefer for those one cares about, the life with pleasure to the life that is pain-filled, all else being equal.
But in this picture desire is an idle wheel. The work is done by plausibility of the suggestion that the conviction that pain is bad and pleasure good would withstand ideal critical reflection. Ideal critical reflection puts us in an ideal position to appreciate the true worth of putative goods and bads. Pains and pleasures are kinds of sensations, or rather a distinctive kind of aspect that colors a wide range of kinds of experiences.
Pleasure and pain feel a certain way that uniformly evokes disliking in the case of the former and liking in the case of the latter. Although it sounds stodgy to say it, the way pain feels is good and sufficient reason to dislike it. The peculiarity of pleasure and pain
is that the quality of experience they provide yields inchoate reasons that might be supposed to resist articulation. There is nothing to say that warrants the claim that a headache is bad, beyond the bare observation that it is bad owing to the way it feels. If 29 someone claims to like a sensation that is identical to the experience of a headache I find horrible, the possibilities are either that the phenomenology is really different (the person, on morphine, feels the pain but not its painful aspect) or that the person's mechanism that induces liking and disliking is faulty. If the person experiences a headache just like mine, the attitude of liking is an inappropriate reaction. 23 I conclude that accounting for the badness of pain does not require embracing a desire fulfillment account.
INFORMED DESIRE FULFILLMENT VERSUS THE OBJECTIVE LIST
We can try to test a sophisticated ideal advisor version of a desire fulfillment view against the rival Objective List doctrine by imagining a scenario in which an individual has a life that is rich in objective list goods but poor in the amount of informed desire fulfillment that is attained. Suppose an individual in very favorable circumstances forms extremely demanding ambitions. Her most important desires are grand in their nature--she wants to become an important public figure who changes the course of history, a consummate world-class artist whose achievements are extensive, strikingly original, brilliantly executed, and well recognized in her day, and a powerful matriarch who molds her family into a lasting dynasty devoted to her memory. In all of these cases the person desires not merely to make a good try at achieving these ambitions but to be successful in these diverse domains. These life goals are reasonable, let's say, and where the height of the ambition creates a high risk of failure, the risks are worth taking all things considered. that I stated at the outset I would not be exploring in this essay.
THE DECISIVE OBJECTION 24
One line of objections against the informed desire view might appear to have a gimmicky and ad hoc flavor, but in fact raises a central issue. An example in this vein is offered by Allan Gibbard, who observes that if you became fully and vividly informed of the internal processes of digestion of a delicious meal, you might lose your desire for savoring delicious food, but even if this should be so, this odd fact should not undermine the claim that enjoyment of good food is a constituent of the good life. 25 The objection invites the reply that one's ideal advisor will know about this possible psychological link and will discount its influence, so that even if the advisor becomes nauseated by revulsion at the thought of digestion, he will still want his advisee to want to enjoy good food.
Put in more general terms, Gibbard's point, and the point of several other objections canvassed, is that the essence of the informed desire view is that what the 32 process of becoming fully informed and critically reflecting causes one to desire for its own sake is good for one (for ideal advisor views, that what the process of learning and reflection causes the advisor to want one to want for its own sake is good for one). But nothing bars this causal process from generating outcomes in a way that does not intuitively confer any desirability on the resultant basic desires. It might simply be a brute psychological fact about me that if I were to become fully informed about grapes, this process would set off a chemical process in my brain that would lead me to crave counting blades of grass on courthouse lawns as my primary life aim. This would seem to be an oddity of my brain, not an indicator of my true well-being. If this were true of everyone, not just me, the same point would still hold. The informed desire theories purport to establish that a certain causal process confers desirability, but the characterization of the causal process does not secure this result and it does not seem that it could be altered to guarantee the right result. Griffin evidently is responding to this worry when he interprets the information requirement in an informed desire account as, in effect, whatever it takes to produce an adequate response to the possible objects of desire. He writes, "So an `informed' desire is one formed by appreciation of the nature of its object, and it includes anything necessary to achieve it." 26 The critic of the account will dig in her heels and insist that people's psychology, due to some quirk of evolution, might be such that fully appreciating the nature of some objects produces bizarre desires regarding them, but the fact that the objects do not appear as desirable in the light of this causal process does not detract from their desirability. One might further refine Griffin's proposal by demanding that an informed desire must be formed only by correct appreciation of its object and not by anything else including any extraneous causal This endorsement constraint can take various forms. I shall consider two versions in this section and a general form of the constraint in the next. One idea, given eloquent expression by Ronald Dworkin, is that nothing can make a basic, noninstrumental contribution to the goodness of a person's life unless it is endorsed by that very person.
27
A second version has been proposed by James Griffin as a constraint on hypothetical ideal desire satisfaction accounts of the good. 28 The constraint is that any noninstrumental, basic desire whose satisfaction contributes to an individual's well-being must be actual when satisfied. So to speak, the hypothetical ideal desire must be endorsed by the person and so become her desire in order that its satisfaction contribute to her well-being.
The attraction of the proposals is evident. It is disagreeable to think that one can improve the quality of a person's life by manipulating him or forcing him to gain putative goods that he does not regard as valuable and would not seek on his own absent the manipulation or forcing.
The endorsement constraint allows us to say that regardless of whether the good that we are contemplating gaining for an individual even though she does not endorse it is great or puny, the "good" gained for the person under this condition will be illusory, because no unendorsed good can contribute to the value of someone's life. In his discussion of the endorsement constraint Dworkin skillfully exhibits how it enables one to combine an objective or perfectionist account of human good with a strong liberal moral presumption against just the type of paternalism that arouses our strong antipathy.
Paternalism in general is restricting someone's liberty against her will for her own good.
35
The type of paternalism that the endorsement constraint seems firmly to prohibit is restricting a competent individual's liberty against her will in order to secure for her a basic, noninstrumental good that she does not recognize as such.
Griffin's version of the endorsement constraint reveals a similar attraction. Some examples will incline us toward accepting it. For example, even if an ideally informed and reflective version of myself would love drinking champagne, if my actual uninformed and unreflective self is averse to the stuff, no gain in my utility can be secured by getting me to drink some when I lack all desire to do that.
Despite their glittering attractive qualities, both versions of the endorsement constraint should be resisted.
The objection to the endorsement constraint is that people's reasons for declining to endorse some putative good they are seeking or that is falling in their lap can be weak, confused, or even nonexistent. Suppose Samantha writes a brilliant poem but denies that this achievement has any value or in any way enhances her life. Her ground for this dismissal is a shallow and silly aesthetic theory which she has thoughtlessly embraced.
In these circumstances, her failure to endorse her achievement does not negate its value for her. No doubt her utility would be higher, other things being equal, if she were to endorse it, because a subjective sense of accomplishment is itself a not inconsiderable good, especially when it is well grounded on genuine accomplishment. But this point is fully compatible with rejection of the endorsement constraint. Note also that often other things are not equal. Samantha might be so disposed that becoming the sort of person who would endorse her achievements according to a sensible scale of merit would also involve becoming the sort of person who is not likely to achieve much. In such a case we 36 might prefer for Samantha's own good that she not develop her capacity for selfendorsement but instead develop and exercise her capacity for significant achievement.
There are several possible lines of objection against this criticism of the endorsement constraint, but none proves successful. One might insist that the objection fails to distinguish the value of Samantha's achievement, impersonally regarded as an achievement, and its value regarded as a contribution to Samantha's life. Not everything Samantha does that is good is plausibly viewed as good for Samantha. How can an achievement that is utterly futile and worthless in Samantha's eyes nonetheless qualify as an enhancement of her well-being?
To blunt the force of this rhetorical question, it suffices to note that Samantha's disposition to nonendorsement might be an odd outlier among her psychological traits. Another line of objection begins with the suspicion that if an individual is correctly characterized as seeking or pursuing some good, she must see it as valuable or good in some way. We do not seek things in the belief that they are bad. But this objection is mistaken, and anyway would be powerless to support the endorsement constraint. This last point comes into view once we notice that some goods of human life do not come to us as a result of our striving. They simply happen. These manna from heaven goods would not have to be endorsed by us to count as genuine goods even if it were the case that in order to seek or pursue a good one must endorse it as good. But anyway it is not true that in order to seek or pursue a good one must endorse it as good.
One might see the object of one's pursuit as bad in itself, but a useful means to some further goal. In this spirit Samantha might regard her poetry-writing as hack work but useful nonetheless for producing her livelihood. Or one might pursue something, no doubt finding it attractive in some respect, even though one steadily believes the object of one's striving is bad all things considered, and pursues it just the same due to weakness of will. Or one might strive to gain something on a whim, without considering the true merits of what one is striving for, and when one contemplates this heavy issue of true merits, one is befuddled by it, and emits a confused dismissal.
When an individual fails to endorse a putative good that she either seeks and gets or just gets without seeking, there are two cases to consider. In the first type of case the 38 individual does not endorse the good but does not herself regard her endorsement as a necessary condition for its being so that the putative good has some positive value. She has either not considered the issue or has considered it and does not take her endorsement to be a sine qua non for value. In the second type of case, the individual does believe that if she does not endorse the putative good, it cannot contribute noninstrumentally to the value of her life. But even in the second type of case, we may believe the individual is just wrong on this matter, and the grounds for overriding the individual's own judgment may be powerful. Evaluative judgments are not self-certifying, not in this or any other case.
The endorsement constraint gains unmerited plausibility if one fails to distinguish a general claim about human psychology from a conceptual claim. It is often the case that putative goods that are not regarded as goods by those who get them lack zest, intensity, and strength. If I do not regard professional wrestling to be a worthwhile activity and do not believe that enjoyment gained from watching it adds much value to anyone's life, I am very unlikely to get much value from time spent watching professional wrestling. I probably cannot reach the enjoyment to which an avid fan has ready access.
But homely truths of this sort will not add up to a justification of the endorsement constraint.
The endorsement constraint only holds that a precondition of value for an agent is endorsement by the agent, and does not contain any commitment to the further idea that if something is endorsed by an agent, it has some value. Nor does the endorsement constraint per se make any claim to the effect that the stronger one's endorsement of a putative good, the greater the value of the good, provided one gets it. The former claim is She subscribes to a Stoic philosophy of life according to which such an attachment to a person lowers the quality of her life as she conceives it, and her desires follow her (false, we are assuming) theoretical beliefs. She experiences the choiceworthy thing, having a loving relationship, but her attainment of this good is due to weakness of will on her part.
Of course she has the desires that are part of having a loving relationship, but she has no positive attitude of any sort toward the having of this relationship. And so it goes for other elements of her life. She attains many important goods that qualify as choiceworthy according to the Objective List account, and she experiences a wealth of happiness, pleasure, and related subjective satisfactions. However, her satisfactions and desire fulfillment fail to connect to her objectively choiceworthy achievements in the right way so as to satisfy the weak endorsement constraint. (It may be hard to imagine the case of Samantha as psychologically plausible, but our concern is the logic of the concepts of human flourishing, not what is empirically likely.) Once the issue is squarely posed and irrelevant issues are put aside, I find the weak endorsement case deeply counterintuitive in the verdict it must yield on Samantha's life. The weak endorsement constraint requires us to hold that even if we concede that having a loving relationship is a great human good and that Samantha has one, this attainment counts for nothing so far as her well-being is concerned, given that she lacks positive attitudes toward her great achievement. And the same goes for the other objectively valuable achievements in her (as we are imagining it) rich life. She is happy and has gained many objectively valuable attainments, but her alienation from these attainments means not just that her life is less valuable than it ideally might have been, but that none of her attainments intrinsically 43 enhances her well-being at all. My sense is that the weak endorsement constraint has us swallowing a camel of implausibility to avoid ingesting an epistemic gnat.
Rejection of the weak endorsement constraint is compatible with insistence on internal structure in the Objective List. Features 1 and 2 noted above would have it that to be living a good life, one must have at least a threshold amount of subjective satisfaction (pleasure and desire satisfaction). No doubt one should also add a Feature 3, that to be living a good life, one must have at least a threshold amount of objective goods other than subjective satisfaction. These requirements allow that any attainment of some of any good that is an entry on the Objective List intrinsically enhances one's well-being.
The entries on the Objective List also exhibit positive and negative complementarities.
The prudential value of pleasure is enhanced, I am inclined to hold, when what one takes pleasure in is itself objectively valuable, and the prudential value of pleasure is reduced to some extent when the pleasure is accompanied by ignorance or significantly mistaken belief about the character of the source of the pleasure. for its own sake and good as a means, plays no role in this essay.
